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ABSTRACT
Considered is discrete two-person game theory where the players i
i
choose their strategies independently. 	 Use of mixed strategies intro i
duces probabilistic aspects, so that the payoff to a player has a pro-
bability distribution. 	 Determination of optimum strategies is simplified
when only some reasonable "representative value" is considered for a j
distribution.	 The distribution mean is used for this purpose in expected-
value game theory.	 Another reasonable choice is the distribution median, 3
and this is the basis for median game theory.
	 Median game theory has 4
huge application advantages over expected-value game theory.
	 Payoffs of
)
a very general nature are allowable for median game theory
	 g	 y (some payoffs
may not even be numbers).	 Also, optimum solutions are obtainable for
I
virtually all games.	 These solutions are obtained through orderings of
the outcomes of the game (pairs of payoffs, one to each player) accord-
ing to desirability, with each player doing a separate ordering.
	 This
paper first provides an introduction to median game theory and then
gives the generally applicable solution, which depends on choices of
"relative desirability" functions by the two players (to order the out-
comes).	 Finally, to illustrate the flexibility of median game theory,
there is a discussion (including some examples) about considerations in
selection of relative desirability functions.
*Research partially supported by Mobil Research and Development Corp-
oration.	 Also associated with ONR Contract N00014-68-A-0515 and NASA
Grant NGR.44-007-028.
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INTRODUCTION AND DISCUSSION
Considered is the case of two players with finite numbers of strat-
a
egies. Separately and independently, each player chooses one of his
strategies. Every possible combination of strategies determines a pair
of payoffs, one to each player. These pairs are the possible outcomes
for the game. For a given player, his payoffs can be expressed conven-
iently in matrix form, where the rows constitute his strategies and the
columns the strategies of the other player. Both payoff matrices are
known to both players.
A mixed strategy occurs for a player when he assigns probabilities
(sum to unity) to his strategies and randomly selects the strategy he
uses according to these probabilities. when at least one player uses
a randomly chosen strategy, the payoff to each player is a random vari-
able, whose distribution is determined by the probabilities that the
players use. These distributions constitute the most information attain-
able about the outcome for the game.
Determination of an optimum choice for the probabilities of the
mixed strategies, with unit probabilities possible, is a basic problem
of game theory. This determination encounters many difficulties when
all the properties of distributions are taken into account. Great sim-
plification occurs, however, when all that is considered is some reason-
able kind of "representative value" for a distribution. The distribution
mean (expected payoff to the player) is used to represent a distribution
when the well known expected-value method is used. Another reasonable
choice is to represent a distribution by its median, and this is the
basis for median game theory.
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Optimum solutions that are of a "controlling" nature are desirable.
That is, an optimum use of mixed strategies controls the game outcome
according to some plausible criterion (such as expected payoff). The
minimax method used for expected-value game theory yields results of
this nature. Also the results developed for median game theory have
this property (with respect to a median criterion).
i
The first sevaral results developed for median game theory are for
the situation where the players behave competitively. These results
emphasize the ranking of payoffs, separately within each matrix (refs.
1 and 2). This initial method has very desirable features with regard
	 7
to the effort needed for application (re`. 3). For example, very gen-
eral kinds of payoffs can occur. Also, an ordering of the payoffs with-
in each matrix, plus accurate evaluation of at most two payoffs in each
	
d^
matrix (whose locations are identified by the orderings), is sufficient
for application. Virtually all payoffs need to be accurately evaluated
for expected-value game theory.'
This initial median method also has strong advantages over expec-
ted-value game theory with regard to generality of application. The
players behave as competitors in both cases. Also, the games with
minimax solutions are a very small subclass of the class of games where
optimum median solutions exist when the initial method is used. Also,
a median optimum solution can exist for one player but not for the other,
which seems to have no analogue in expected-value game theory (ref. 2),
r
,
i
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However, the class of games with a median optimum solution (for at least
	 i
one player) on this basis is a very small subclass of all the discrete
two-person games where the players behave competitively, and an ex-
ceedingly small subclass of the games where competitive behavior need
not occur.
A change of the emphasis to ordering of outcomes (rather than pay-
offs) results in a median approach that is applicable for virtually all
discrete two-person games, Moreover, the players need not behave com-
petitively. The only requirement is that, separately, each player is
able to order the possible outcomes according to increasing desirability
to him (with equal desirability possible at places in the ordering).
The first result of this nature, but with the players using "relative
desirability" function of a specialized kind (appropriate for a type of
competitive behavior) to order the outcomes, occurs, in ref. 4. This
is easily extended to situations where general kinds of relative desir-
ability functions can be used (based on an idea in ref. 5) and is a re- 	 '-s
sult of this paper. The way a player behaves is specified by the rela-
tive desirability function that he uses for ordering the outcomes.
The availability of suitable relative desirability functions is im-
portant with respect to the effort needed for application. Ordering of
the outcomes, by each player, does not require very much effort when
the functions are available. Otherwise, some genera]. method, such as
paired comparisons, might need to be used, If the number of outcomes N
is large the number of possible paired comparisons for a player, N(N-1)/2,
is huge, it is to be noted that virtually all payoffs ordinarily .need
14A,
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i
to be accurately evaluated if the outcomes are to be ordered. An excep-
tion to this requirement occurs when the specialized kind of function
introduced in ref, 4 is used,
So much freedom is available in the selection of relative desirabi-
lity functions that difficulties can arise in making a definite'choice.
To aid in such selections, several possible types of functions, and how
these can reflect a player's desires, receive consideration. Of course, 	 j
virtuall y an function with one-dimensional numerical valuesY	 Y	 (	 ) of the
two payoffs of an outcome could be used as a relative desirability func-
tion
The next section is devoted to the generally applicable median ap-
proach that is based on orderings of outcomes. The final section con-
tains some examples of relative desirability functions.
r"
GIMRALLY APPLICABLE APPROACH
The same results apply to each player and are given for player i
(i=1, 2). These results are stated in terms of a marking of outcome
positions in the payoff matrix for player i (that is, the payoffs to
player i, in the outcomes considered, are marked). The method of
verification is very analogous to that given in refs. 2, 4 and no details
are stated here.
First, mark the position(s) in the payoff matrix for player i of
the outcome(s) with the highest level of desirability to player i. Next, 	 in
mark the position(s) of the outcome(s) with the next to highest level of
desirabliity, Continue this marking, according to decreasing level of
desirability, until the first time that marks in all columns can be
INS
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obtained from two or fewer rows, Now remove the mark(s) for the least
desirable outcome(s) of these that received marks, Then, by the follow-
	
1
ing procedure, determine whether some one of the remaining outcomes can
be assured with probability at least 1/2. The procedure is to replace
every marked position in the matrix by unity and all other positions with
zero, The resulting matrix is considered to be that for player i in a
zero-sum game with an expected-value basis, and is solved for the value
of the game to player i. Some one of the outcomes corresponding to the
marked positions can be assured with probability at least 1/2 if and only
if this game value is at least 1/2,•
Suppose that the game value is less than 1/2, Then, the largest
level of desirability that can be assured with probability at least 1/2
is the level that corresponds to the outcome(s) with marking(s) removed
at this step. otherwise, when the game value is at least 1/2, remove
the mark(s) for the least desirable outcome(s) of those still having
marks. Then, by another use of the procedure given above, determine
whether some one of the remaining marked outcomes can be assured with
probability at least 1/2. If not, the maximum level of desirability
that can be assured with probability at least 1/2 is the level that cor-
responds to the outcome(s) with marking(s) removed at this step. If a
probability of at least 1/2 can be assured, continue in the same manner
until the first time some one of the remainir, 	 xed outcomes cannot be
assured with probability at least 1/2. Then, the largest desirability
level that can be assured with probability at least 1/2 is the level for
the outcome(s) with marking(s) removed at this last step. 	
i
-7-
Now, consider determination of a median optimum strategy for player i.
Use the markings in the matrix of player i that, by the method used, ul-
timately resulted in the smallest set of marked outcomes such that some
one of these outcomes can be assured with probability at least 1/2.
Replace the marked positions by unity and the unmarked positions by zero
Treat the resulting matrix as that for player'i in a zero-sum game wit:1
an expected-value basis. An optimum strategy for player i in this zero-
sum game is median optimum for him.
The method used here is similar to that of ref. 2, 4. It is,a sim-
plification (of the method in ref. 1) that, for a specified minimum de-
sirability level, maximizes the probability that at least this desira-
bility level occurs.
EXAMPLES OF DESIRABILITY FUNCTIONS
Virtually complete freedom is available in expressing the desires
of a player (for the outcomes of a game) by use of a relative desira-
bility function. However, this does not imply that any choice that
might be made is necessarily satisfactory. On the contrary, great care
can be needed to determine a function that is suitable. This great free-
dom of choice is a valuable property, but only if used wisely. Several
examples are given to illustrate considerations in the development of
relative desirability functions. In general, an ordering function for
player i is denoted by Di (pl ,pa), where p, and pa are the payoffs received
by players 1 and 2, respectively. For simplicity, but without much loss
of generality, p, and pa are expressed as numbers which are such that
increasing values of p,
s 
represent nondecreasing desirability of the pay-
offs to player J (i=1, 2).
to
i
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The first situation is one where player 1 is considered and the
players behave competitively, Suppose that an increase of 1 in p l has
the same desirability, to player 1, as a decrease of 10 in pa. Then,
use of
D, (PI ) pa) = Pi - PA/10
would seem appropriate, where it is to be noted that D j (p 1 +1 ) pa) equals
Dl (pj , p,-10) for all possible values for p l and p jq, Incidentally, the
same ordering would be obtained if D^(pl , pg) were replaced by any strict-
ly monotonic increasing function of pl-p2/10.
Next, consider. player 2 and a situation where an increase in p l is
desirable to player 2, although not nearly as desirable as the same in-
crease in pa, Suppose that an increase of 1 in p. has the same desira-
bility, to player 2, as an increase of 8 in p l , Then, use of
Da(P1, pa) = Pa + p1/8
would seem suitable, where the relation
Dg (P1 +8 ) pQ ) = Da (P1, PB +l )
is seen to hold for all possible p l and p 2 . Here the same ordering is
obtained when D2 (pl , pa) is replaced by any strictly monotonic increas-
ing function of pa + pl/8.
Now, consider player 1 and a more complicated type of competitive
behavior. Here, pz > 0 and p 2 > 0 for the situation that occurs. Sup-
pose that an increase of 10 percent in p l has the same desirability, to
player 1, as a 40 percent decrease in p 2 , Then use of
D1 (P1 ) p2 ) = logs op: + 
P
og 1.J-)/(log .6)1ogs o Pq
would seem suitable, It is to be noticed that 	 ,J
D1 ( 111 P1) P2 ) = D1 (pl, • 6 p2)
4
0
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for all allowable p l and pg. Again, the same ordering would be obtained
if a strictly monotonic increasing function of D j (pl , pa) is used in
place of D1 (p l ^ P2).
Finally, consider player 2 and another c6mplicated type of competi-
tive behavior. Here, pl > 0 for the situation that occurs, ,suppose
that an increase of 1 in pa has the same desirability, to player 2, as
a 15 percent decrease in p l , Then, use of
-1
Dg Cpl I pg) - pa - (log, 0 . 85) logldpz
would seem appropriate, where
Da(pl , pa+l ) = D2 (.85p1 , pg)
is seen ^;c hold for all allowable p l and pg.
It is to be observed that a change in the value of p l and/or the
value of pg does not necessarily result in a change in the value of
D1(pl, pa) or of D2 (pz, pg). This occurs, for example, when the special
kind of relative desirability function introduced in ref. 4 is used.
For this kind of function, all (p l , pa) such the:t pl z P1 and also
P2 5 r have maximum desirability for player 1, and all (pa, pa) such
that pl 5 Pi and also pa z Pa have maximum desirability for player 2.
Determination of P1i Pa, Pi, P21 is considered in refs. 1 and 2 (with
PI) PII , PI, PI I used as the notation, respectivel)), However, the
(p l , p2 ) that do not satisfy p l ^t P1 and p2 s P 1 are ordered by player
1 through use of some function D1 (pl , pg), perhaps %f a type considered
above, for the situation of players behaving competitively. Also, the
(p11 pa) not satisfying p, s Pi and p ' z Pa are ordered through use of
some Da(pl , pg) by player 2 for the situation of players who behave as
competitors.
I 
i
i
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